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Questioning the Sacrosanct: How to Reduce 




Veterans’ preference law grants military veterans decisive advantages 
when applying for government positions. While rewarding veterans and 
assisting their transition back to civilian life may be worthy goals, veterans’ 
preference has at least two major defects. First, veterans’ preference 
disparately affects women, LGBT persons, disabled persons, and others 
because of the military’s traditional exclusion of these groups. Second, 
veterans’ preference unnecessarily reduces the quality of the federal 
workforce because it prioritizes military service over merit and 
competition. Potential statutory and constitutional solutions have been 
precluded by the courts, and so these problems persist. This Note 
recommends that Congress modify veterans’ preference by imposing 
limitations on its duration and usage; in the alternative, it suggests other 
ways in which veterans’ preference law might be improved. 
INTRODUCTION 
Veterans’ preference law gives veterans assistance in securing 
government employment, but it does so at the expense of nondiscrimination 
and efficiency. First, veterans’ preference discriminates against women, 
LGBT persons, and others because these groups have traditionally been 
prohibited from serving in the military. Second, veterans’ preference 
promotes inefficiency because it suspends merit and competition in favor of 
less rational considerations. Legislators and courts have generally 
overlooked these flaws, however, and so they remain embedded in the law. 
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This Note describes the legal framework of veterans’ preference, 
analyzes its effects, and proposes ways in which the law could be improved. 
Part I summarizes the history of veterans’ preference law, outlines its 
substantive provisions, and surveys federal antidiscrimination law. Part II 
describes veterans’ preference law’s disparate impact on protected classes, 
evaluates its constitutional foundations, and critiques its policy 
justifications. Part III proposes numerous potential modifications to 
veterans’ preference—including time and usage limitations—and this Note 
concludes by calling upon Congress to enact such changes. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF VETERANS’ PREFERENCE LAW 
Veterans’ preference law’s history stretches from pensions awarded to 
disabled veterans after the Revolutionary War, to the barebones federal 
statute that followed the Civil War, to the Veterans’ Preference Act of 
1944.1 Today, veterans’ preference involves hiring veterans over candidates 
who may possess superior qualifications, which results in a disproportionate 
number of veterans filling federal positions.2 This, in turn, disparately 
impacts several classes traditionally protected by federal antidiscrimination 
law and breeds inefficiency.3 
A. History of Veterans’ Preference Law 
1. Revolutionary War to Civil War 
Throughout the history of organized conflict, soldiers have received 
compensation for their efforts, partly in the form of regular pay, but also in 
the form of preferential post-conflict treatment.4 In Europe, early preference 
 
1 See Part I.A. Though this Note addresses several state veterans’ preference statutes, its 
focus is on federal veterans’ preference law. 
2 See Part I.B. 
3 See Part I.C. 
4 See, e.g., Rebecca Beatrice Brooks, Continental Soldiers in the Revolutionary War, 
HIST. MASS. BLOG (Dec. 26, 2017), https://historyofmassachusetts.org/continental-
soldiers-revolutionary-war/ [https://perma.cc/AR44-8MYJ] (discussing compensation of 
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systems featured the use of pensions, enlistment and service bonuses, and 
compensation or medical care for service-related injuries and disabilities.5 
In the United States, pensions were awarded to disabled veterans as far back 
as 1636.6 While there was not an express legal basis for extending these 
benefits to veterans, familiar policies like adequately compensating 
servicepersons for the risks of combat and incentivizing military service 
were likely at play.7 
The Continental Congress enacted the country’s first veteran pension law 
in 1776, granting a lifetime annuity to veterans who would lose limbs or 
incur other serious disabilities during the Revolutionary War.8 This pension 
was worth up to half the veteran’s previous pay.9 These benefits were 
extended to the widows and orphans of Revolutionary War veterans in 
1816.10 
 
Revolutionary War soldiers); Valerie M. Hope, Constructing Roman Identity: Funerary 
Monuments and Social Structure in the Roman World, 2 MORTALITY 103, 116 (1997) 
(describing the Roman Empire’s practice of granting citizenship to foreign nationals who 
served in the military for twenty-five years). 
5 Veterans Services: Vet Guide, U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/veterans-services/vet-guide-for-hr-professionals/ [https://perma.cc/EC8D-
66RG] [hereinafter OPM, VET GUIDE]. 
6 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., VA HISTORY IN BRIEF 3, 
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EC8D-66RG] [hereinafter VA HISTORY IN BRIEF]. As the Supreme 
Court has aptly observed, veterans’ preference laws tend to ebb and flow with the tide of 
the nation’s wars. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280 (1979) (“After 
a war, [veterans’ preference] laws have been enacted virtually without opposition. During 
peacetime, they inevitably have come to be viewed in many quarters as undemocratic and 
unwise.”). 
7 OPM, VET GUIDE, supra note 5; see also Part II.C (discussing these policies). 
8 VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 6, at 3. When the new government discovered that 
this promise would be difficult to keep, it authorized grants of public lands in lieu of 
payment. See id. It is unlikely that more than three thousand veterans actually collected 
pension payments. Id. 
9 VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 6, at 3. There was not a strong distinction between 
pension benefits, military compensation, and veterans’ preference during this time. Id. at 
8. 
10 Id. at 3. Depending on the reader’s perspective, governmental concern for the wives 
and children of deceased or disabled veterans may appear either noble or patriarchal. See 
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The United States’ next veteran pension law, the Revolutionary War 
Pension Act of 1818, was enacted in response to the War of 1812.11 The act 
required that veterans demonstrate both wartime service and financial need 
before receiving benefits—though neither burden was particularly 
onerous.12 These benefits took the form of a fixed pension sufficient for a 
“comfortable and frugal existence.”13 The Service Pension Law of 1818 
remained the country’s only approximation of a veterans’ preference statute 
until after the Civil War.14 
2. Civil War to World War II 
Between 1865 and 1945, Congress enacted numerous statutes which 
expressly provided for veterans’ preference. These statutes contained the 
same basic requirements which exist today regarding the preferential 
treatment of veterans in appointment, retention, and reinstatement.15 
 
Steven Lim, The Effect of Veterans’ Reemployment Rights, Veterans Preference Laws, 
and Protective Labor Laws on the Status of Women Workers in the World War II Period, 
2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 301 (1985) (documenting attitudes towards women during the 
1940s); John H. Fleming & Charles A. Shanor, Veterans’ Preference in Public 
Employment: Unconstitutional Gender Discrimination?, 26 EMORY L.J. 13, 20 (1977) 
(veterans’ preference statutes not sex-neutral). 
11 Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem 
of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1095 
(1997). See generally John P. Resch, Politics and Culture: The Revolutionary War 
Pension Act of 1818, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 139 (1988). 
12 Dilley, supra note 11, at 1095–96 (describing this “double test of worthiness”). To 
demonstrate financial need, veterans “had to report their residence, occupation, health, 
income, debts, and an inventory of real and personal property to the War Department,” as 
well as their “age, gender, physical condition,” household relationships, and other 
sources of financial aid. John P. Resch, Federal Welfare for Revolutionary War Veterans, 
56 SOC. SERV. REV. 171, 172 (1982). This burden was slight, however, and, along with 
the statute’s lack of a disability requirement, it allowed the number of recipients to 
increase by over eight hundred percent. See VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
13 Resch, supra note 12, at 173 (footnote omitted). 
14 See Part I.A.2. 
15 See Part I.B.2. 
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The first of these laws was enacted at the close of the Civil War in 
1865.16 In broad and generalized terms, it proclaimed the nation’s official 
policy of granting preference to disabled veterans when filling federal 
positions, provided that applicants were able to perform the essential 
functions of the job in question.17 This statute did not permit preferential 
treatment of veterans at the expense of applicants with superior 
qualifications, however.18 Because there was no uniform civil service 
examining system at the time, “this preference law had only such effect as 
each appointing officer was willing to give it.”19 In 1881, the Attorney 
General officially interpreted the law as only requiring preference when 
veterans’ qualifications were equal to those of other applicants.20 Veterans’ 
preference law expanded to cover both retention rights21 and reinstatement22 
 
16 A Resolution to Encourage the Employment of Disabled and Discharged Soldiers, Res 
27, 38th Cong.,13 Stat. 571 (1865). 
17 Id. (“Persons honorably discharged from the military or naval service by reason of 
disability resulting from wounds or sickness incurred in the line of duty, shall be 
preferred for appointment to civil offices, provided they be found to possess the business 
capacity necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of such offices.”); see also Act 
of June 8, 1929, 46 Stat. 21; Act of July 11, 1919, 41 Stat. 131, 142; Act of Mar. 3, 1919, 
40 Stat. 1291, 1293; Act of Mar. 1, 1919, 40 Stat. 1213, 1224; Act of Jan. 16, 1883, 22 
Stat. 403. 
18 Stewart S. Manela, Note, Veterans’ Preference in Public Employment: The History, 
Constitutionality, and Effect on Federal Personnel Practices of Veterans’ Preference 
Legislation, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 625 (1976) [hereinafter Veterans’ Preference 
in Public Employment]; see also Astrid De Parry, De Jure Discrimination in the Public 
Sector: Is Veterans’ Preference Legislation Rational?, 12 INDUS. & LAB. REL. F. 65, 67 
(1977) (“although the Pendleton Act sanctioned existing veterans’ preference-policies, it 
did not require substantial deviations from the competitive norm to permit preferential 
advancement of less qualified veterans.”). 
19 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, HISTORY OF VETERAN PREFERENCE IN FEDERAL 
EMPLOYMENT, 1865–1955 at 1 (1955). 
20 Id. at 2. This interpretation prevailed until 1910, when the Taft administration began 
to require more absolute preference, and it was then changed again in 1923. Veterans’ 
Preference in Public Employment, supra note 18, at 624–25. 
21 Act of August 15, 1876, 19 Stat. 169 (“in making any reduction in force in any of the 
executive departments the head of such department shall retain those persons who may 
be equally qualified who have been honorably discharged from the military”); see also 5 
U.S.C. § 3502; 5 C.F.R. § 351.203, .501, .602 (2018); Act of Aug. 23, 1912, 37 Stat. 413. 
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during this period, and veterans’ preference also survived the arrival of the 
Pendleton Act in 1883.23 Other statutes which enlarged veterans’ preference 
protections included the General Pension Act of 1862,24 the Homestead Act 
of 1862,25 and various state laws.26 The expansion of veterans’ preference 
law culminated after World War I, when veterans’ preference was extended 
“to all honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines” and their 
widows, regardless of their disability status or periods of service.27 
This trend of broadening veteran protections resulted in an explosion of 
veterans’ preference claims: from less than one thousand per year before the 
 
22 Exec. Order of June 18, 1889 (allowing reinstatement of veterans who were also 
former federal employees without respect to the amount of time elapsed since their 
employment as such); see also U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 3. 
23 Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 40 U.S.C.). The Pendleton Act contained a 
provision expressly preserving veterans’ preference. Id. (“[N]othing herein contained 
shall be construed to take away from those honorably discharged from the military or 
naval service any preference conferred by the 1754th section of the Revised Statutes”). 
The Pendleton Act required applicants to demonstrate individual merit in seeking 
government positions and was the forerunner of the modern civil service examining 
system; it was created to combat the corruption which had plagued several 
administrations. See generally Victor Lapuente & Marina Nistotskaya, To the Short-
Sighted Victor Belong the Spoils: Politics and Merit Adoption in Comparative 
Perspective, 22 GOVERNANCE 431 (2009) (finding a positive correlation between merit-
based hiring systems and political stability). 
24 General Pension Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 566 (granting benefits to disabled veterans, 
orphans, widows, and other dependent relatives, and including veterans who served 
during peacetime); see also Peter Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil 
Rights: Civil War Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1, 
10 (2000) (discussing the General Pension Act). Remaining confederate veterans did not 
become eligible for benefits under this act until they were pardoned in 1958. John P. 
Stimson, Veterans’ Preference Act Of 1944, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2004), 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-
maps/veterans-preference-act-1944 [https://perma.cc/D6CK-C3HS]. 
25 Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (granting certain preferences 
to Union veterans in homesteading); see also VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 6, at 3. 
26 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, n.6 (1979) (citing sources 
compiling state veterans’ preference laws). 
27 Census Act of March 3, 1919, 40 Stat. 1293; U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 19, 
at 5. This 1919 statute remained the basic federal veterans’ preference law until the 
enactment of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944. See id. 
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1919 Census Act to over sixty thousand per year following its enactment.28 
Consequentially, the civil service system began to evolve to better account 
for veterans’ preference laws and to address concerns that preference was 
negatively impacting the federal workforce.29 A system in which applicants 
were evaluated on a one hundred point scale was already in use, but it was 
modified to require that either five or ten additional points be awarded to 
veterans, depending on their disability status.30 After this, the top three 
applicants would be referred to the selecting official.31 This “Rule of Three” 
was designed to “restore competition” rather than requiring “that 
appointments be given to veterans irrespective of applicants of much 
superior qualifications.”32 Under the Rule of Three, passing over a veteran 
in favor of a less qualified or equally qualified candidate required written 
justification.33 Military experience was independently creditable during 
evaluation of applicants if the service was similar to the work being 
performed.34 These changes were followed by increased lobbying from 
veterans’ groups and demonstrations,35 the creation of the Veterans 
 
28 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 6. 
29 Id. at 6–7. 
30 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE, 1789 TO THE 
PRESENT 102 (1941). This one hundred point scale is still in use today. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. 
§ 337.101(a) (2018). 
31 This referral was and is generally referred to as “certification” or “issuing the 
certificate.” BEN L. ERDREICH ET AL., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., THE RULE OF THREE 
IN FEDERAL HIRING: BOON OR BANE? vii (1995), 
https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=253660&version=2
53947&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/2QV4-Q57L]. 
32 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 7 (quoting from a Civil Service 
Commission letter to President Warren G. Harding). 
33 Exec. Order No. 5610 (1931), 3 C.F.R. § 6.2, 7.1. 
34 Exec. Order No. 3801 (1923), reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. § 3311(2). This 
provision was included in the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 and is now codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 3311(2). If the veteran’s employment in a similar position is “interrupted” by 
military service, the entire period of military service is creditable, regardless of whether 
the veteran was engaged in activities similar to those of the position during the service 
period. Id. 5 U.S.C § 3311(1). 
35 VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 6, at 9–11; U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N supra note 19, 
at 15. 
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Administration,36 and eventually the World War II G.I. Bill37 and the 
Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944.38 
3. World War II to Present 
The Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 was enacted against the backdrop 
of the largest war, as well as the greatest financial crisis, the United States 
had ever experienced.39 Both the House and the Senate introduced 
legislation to ease the transition of millions of returning servicepersons,40 
and the House bill passed by an impressive margin.41 President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt signed the act into law on June 27, 1944.42 The statute conferred 
veterans’ preference on honorably discharged veterans with service-
connected disabilities, as well as their wives and unmarried widows; 
honorably discharged veterans who served during specified periods; and the 
mothers of deceased or disabled veterans who met certain conditions.43 The 
act applied to hiring, reinstatement, and retention, and it also granted 
veterans certain appeal rights.44 Congress also gave legislative sanction to 
 
36 VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 6, at 12. 
37 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (providing 
veterans with unemployment compensation, federal loans, and subsidized education). 
38 See Part I.A.3. 
39 Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
40 H.R. 4115, 78th Cong. (1944); S. 1762, 78th Cong. (1944). Congress did not 
rigorously evaluate what preferences were being granted, however, and it did not 
consider the law’s collateral effects. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1762 and H.R. 4115 Before 
the S. Comm. on Civil Service, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1944) (statement of H. Eliot 
Kaplan, Executive Secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League); Hearings on 
S. 1762 and H.R. 4115 Before the S. Comm. on Civil Service, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 8–9 
(1944) (remarks of Rep. Joe Starnes). 
41 The bill passed the House with only one dissenting vote; it was approved unanimously 
in the Senate. U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 15–16. 
42 Id. 
43 The act did not cover those serving in semi-military or civilian positions with the 
armed forces. Id. at 20. Nor did the act cover veterans who had served during peacetime. 
Stimson, supra note 24. 
44 Nonveterans did not acquire appeal rights until 1962. See Exec. Order No. 10,987, 27 
Fed. Reg. 550 (1962); see also Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 
Questioning the Sacrosanct 47 
VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020 
benefits previously created by executive order or regulation, including five- 
and ten-point preference and the Rule of Three.45 
In the years since the Veterans’ Preference Act became law, legislators 
have frequently attempted to amend the statute. The Veterans’ Preference 
Act now covers veterans of World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War, the Persian Gulf War, the Iraq War, and other conflicts.46 The most 
significant attempt at reform occurred when the Carter administration tried 
to include veterans’ preference in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.47 
The administration proposed ten-year and single-usage limitations on 
veterans’ preference for non-disabled veterans, as well as lesser retention 
rights for veterans and exclusions for high-level military retirees.48 The time 
limitation was increased to fifteen years before the bill was passed out of 
 
Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (sanctioning appeal rights for all federal employees because 
governmental deprivation of the property interest in employment requires due process). 
45 Stimson, supra note 24; U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 19, at 15. The act 
contains certain exceptions for the legislative branch, the judicial branch, and some 
executive positions. 5 U.S.C. § 3304(d). 
46 OPM, VET GUIDE, supra note 5. 
47 See H.R. 11280, 95th Cong. (1978); S. 2640, 95th Cong. (1978); see also Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
48 See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Carter Wins in House Committee on Cutting 
Veteran’s Preference, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1978, at A18, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/06/29/archives/carter-wins-in-house-committee-on-
cutting-veterans-preference.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/WFE7-
DFLZ]; see also CQ Press, Congress Approves Civil Service Reforms, 34 CQ ALMANAC 
818 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Patricia Schroeder asserting that the Veterans’ Preference 
Act of 1944 was intended to grant temporary rather than perpetual benefits to veterans). 
The veterans’ preference limitations were generally supported by federal managers, 
suggesting that those tasked with applying veterans’ preference law were aware of its 
negative effects. Naomi B. Lynn & Richard E. Vaden, Bureaucratic Response to Civil 
Service Reform, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 333, 339 (1979) (finding that seventy-five percent 
of federal managers supported time limits for veterans’ preference). 
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committee, but the proposals were nonetheless defeated by veterans’ 
lobbying groups.49 
Today, veterans’ preference law is at its zenith, and attempts to 
modernize the Veterans’ Preference Act are quickly quashed by veterans’ 
lobbying groups.50 Other laws benefiting veterans enacted since 1944 
include: the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, which requires 
affirmative action for veterans;51 the Veteran Employment Opportunities 
Act of 1998, which provides a special federal hiring authority for 
veterans;52 and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits discrimination against 
veterans.53 
B. Overview of Veterans’ Preference Law 
1. Federal Hiring Process 
Understanding the application of veterans’ preference law first requires 
an understanding of the federal hiring process. Like in the private sector, 
 
49 Ayres, supra note 48, at A18; CQ Press, supra note 48. Another factor in the demise 
of the Carter administration’s proposal was congressional reluctance to tether the fate of 
the entire reform bill to the emotionally charged subject of veterans’ preference. Id. 
50 The power of veterans’ lobbying groups is immense. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, 
Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1101 n.92 
(2010) (relating example of an aborted change to the tax-free status of veteran disability 
payments); David A. Gerber, Disabled Veterans and Public Welfare Policy: 
Comparative and Transnational Perspectives on Western States in the Twentieth 
Century, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 85 (2001) (“[d]isabled veterans 
have been a particularly well-organized segment of modem society”); Samuel H. 
Ordway, The Veteran in the Civil Service, 238 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 133, 
133 (1945) (“Veteran pressure groups continually seek extension of the coverage and the 
amount of preference granted, with more and more disregard for criteria of qualification 
for the position sought.”). 
51 Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 
1578 (1974). 
52 Veteran Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-339, 11 Stat. 3182. 
53 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335); see also Part 
II.C.4 (documenting various other protections). 
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federal hiring begins with localized needs, which are submitted to agency 
human resources specialists for assessment and analysis.54 Human resources 
specialists then create job announcements that remain open for 
predetermined amounts of time, after which applicants’ credentials are 
evaluated, candidates are certified to selecting officials, and interviews are 
conducted.55 Candidates’ references are then checked, selections made, 
tentative offers issued, and background investigations begun—after which 
selectees receive final job offers and their entry on duty dates.56 Veterans’ 
preference is applied at the time that applicants’ credentials—such as their 
resumes, cover letters, and transcripts—are evaluated; however, the process 
differs depending on whether the Rule of Three or a Category Rating 
method is utilized.57 
 




56 Id. It is not uncommon for this process to take several months. See, e.g., Nicole 
Ogrysko, It Took Agencies an Average of 106 Days to Hire New Employees in 2017, 
FED. NEWS NETWORK, (March 1, 2018, 5:26 PM) 
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/hiring-retention/2018/03/it-took-agencies-an-average-of-
106-days-to-hire-new-employees-in-2017// [https://perma.cc/67GA-8LUG]. This process 
may differ for individual agencies, positions, and hiring authorities excepted from normal 
competitive procedures. See 5 C.F.R. § 302 (2020); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., 
VETERAN HIRING IN THE CIVIL SERVICE: PRACTICES AND PERCEPTIONS 21–24 (2014), 
https://www.mspb.gov/mspbsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1072040&version=1076
346&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/274V-JV39] [hereinafter MSPB, 
VETERAN HIRING] (describing the excepted service). 
57 See Part I.B.2. As discussed in Part I.A.2, the Rule of Three originated during the 
1920s. The Category Rating method involves referring all candidates in the “best 
qualified” category, and it received government-wide authorization in 2002. See 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1312, 116 Stat. 2135, 1312 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3319(a)). In 2010, the Obama administration issued an executive 
memorandum requiring agencies to use the Category Rating method. Memorandum on 
Improving the Federal Recruitment and Hiring Process, 1 PUB. PAPERS 998 (May 14, 
2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-
improving-federal-recruitment-and-hiring-process [https://perma.cc/5UQD-VG5L]. 
Nevertheless, the Rule of Three remains ensconced in the United States Code. See 5 
U.S.C. § 3318(a). 
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2. Substantive Provisions of Veterans’ Preference Law 
For veterans’ preference to attach, applicants for federal58 positions must 
first meet the minimum requirements for the position in question,59 and they 
must also satisfy the statutory definition of “veteran.”60 This definition 
requires the applicant to have participated in active duty service during 
periods corresponding with specified United States wars or military 
campaigns.61 Veterans’ preference only applies to appointment procedures 
and promotions between agencies; internal agency promotions are 
excepted.62 
After these coverage requirements are met, the application of veterans’ 
preference rules depends on whether the Rule of Three or a Category 
 
58 All fifty states have some form of veterans’ preference law. Fleming & Shanor, supra 
note 10, at 13; see also Michael D. Sutton, Comment, Forging a New Breed: The 
Emergence of Veterans’ Preference Statutes Within the Private Sector, 67 ARK. L. REV. 
1081, 1081 n.1 (2014) (compiling statutes). These statutes differ, however, in their 
application to hiring, promotion, and retention; requirements regarding residency, 
honorable discharge, receipt of medals, and disability status; and coverage of mothers, 
orphans, unmarried spouses, etc. See id. at 1088–91. Some state laws also award 
preference for characteristics not covered by federal veterans’ preference law and many 
are quite vague. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 39.25.159(a)(1) (2019) (awarding 
additional points to former prisoners of war); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.413 (2019) 
(awarding additional points to “war veterans.”). 
59 See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 58, at 1096. 
60 See 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1). 
61 See id. § 2108(1)(A)–(D). Veterans’ preference may extend to the spouses, unmarried 
widows or widowers, and parents of veterans under specified conditions. See id. 
§ 2108(3). The definition of “veteran” excludes non-disabled veterans who retire at the 
rank of major or above. See id. § 2108(4)–(5). The definition’s full-time requirement also 
generally excludes reservists, though they may be covered under state laws. See id. 
§ 2108(1)(B); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 39.25.159(c) (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 
43-1-9 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 284.260(1)(d) (2017). 
62 See 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f); 5 C.F.R. § 335.106 (2020); Brown v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 
247 F.3d 1222, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The preference granted to veterans applying for 
inter-agency promotion positions takes the form of the opportunity to compete rather 
than affirmative selection advantages. See Special Hiring Authorities for Veterans, U.S. 
OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.fedshirevets.gov/job-seekers/special-hiring-
authorities/ [https://perma.cc/PF5X-V2EK]. 
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Rating method is employed.63 Under the Rule of Three, human resources 
specialists first assign each applicant a numerical rating before adding 
additional points to the scores of qualified veterans.64 Most preference 
eligible veterans receive five additional points, though veterans may receive 
up to ten points if they have a service-connected disability—even when the 
disability is not sustained during a statutorily prescribed period.65 
Under the Category Rating regime, applicants are separated into several 
quality categories—most often labeled as highly-qualified, well-qualified, 
and minimally qualified—and all applicants in the highest category are 
referred to the appropriate selecting officials.66 Veterans with service-
connected disabilities, the equivalent of ten-point veterans under the Rule of 
Three, are automatically assigned to the highest category if they are 
minimally qualified, and they must be selected ahead of non-preference 
eligible candidates within the category.67 Other veterans, the equivalent of 
five-point veterans under the Rule of Three, are not automatically assigned 
to the highest quality category, but still must be selected ahead of non-
preference eligible candidates within their assigned categories.68 
 
63 The Category Rating system tends to be more favorable towards veterans than the 
Rule of Three. See MSPB, VETERAN HIRING, supra note 56, at 11. 
64 E.g., MSPB, VETERAN HIRING, supra note 56, at 7; Veterans’ Preference, U.S. OFF. 
OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.fedshirevets.gov/job-seekers/veterans-preference/ 
[https://perma.cc/DA8S-8H4K]. 
65 See 5 C.F.R. § 337.101 (2020); MSPB, VETERAN HIRING, supra note 56, at 7; U.S. 
OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 64. Individuals who are the sole surviving immediate 
family member of a father, mother, or sibling that was killed, rendered completely 
disabled, or declared missing in action may receive zero point preference, which amounts 
to a tiebreaker among equally qualified applicants. See OPM, VET GUIDE, supra note 5; 
see also 5 C.F.R. § 211.102(c)–(d) (2020). The Department of Veterans Affairs generally 
assesses veteran disability status. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2020). 
66 5 C.F.R. § 337.303 (2020). 
67 See 5 U.S.C. § 3319(b), (c)(7); 5 C.F.R. § 337.304 (2020). An exception to this rule 
occurs for professional and scientific positions that are classified as GS-9 or higher. See 5 
U.S.C. § 3319(b). Absolute preference is given to veterans applying for guard, elevator 
operator, messenger, and custodian positions. Id. § 3310. 
68 See 5 U.S.C. § 3319(b), (c)(7); 5 C.F.R. § 337.304; MSPB, VETERAN HIRING, supra 
note 56, at 10. Veterans alleging an agency violation of their preference rights may 
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3. Effects of Veterans’ Preference Law 
The foremost consequence of veterans’ preference law is that veterans 
tend to occupy an outsized number of federal positions.69 Currently the 
federal government employs over six hundred thousand veterans,70 
approximately thirty percent of the federal workforce.71 In contrast, 
veterans account for under ten percent of private sector workers.72 This 
imbalance has increased in recent years,73 and studies have consistently 
 
appeal first to the Department of Labor and then to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 
See Willingham v. Dep’t of the Navy, 118 M.S.P.B. 21, 24 (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. § 
2302(b)(11). 
69 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, An Analysis of Workers’ Choice Between Employment in 
the Public and Private Sectors, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 211, 219 (1985) (finding 
that veterans are much more likely to work for the federal government than nonveterans 
of the same race, sex, educational level, and experience). In addition to the effect of 
veterans’ preference on federal hiring, many government contractors are required to 
implement affirmative action plans for veterans. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.44 (2020). 
Notably, there is no guarantee that compliance will shield contractors from liability. See 
Kenneth T. Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment 
Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69, 166 (1977). 
70 U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH FISCAL YEAR 2014 i (2015), 
https://www.fedshirevets.gov/veterans-council/veteran-employment-data/employment-
of-veterans-in-the-federal-executive-branch-fy2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZS4-278D]. 
There are about nineteen million veterans in the United States today; following World 
War II, there were approximately fifteen million; following the Civil War, there were a 
little under three million, including former Confederate soldiers; following the 
Revolutionary War, there were a little over two hundred thousand. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFS., AMERICA’S WARS, 
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BW96/XB4L]. 
71 See, e.g., LINDA E. BROOKS RIX, AVUE, THE DANGERS OF OVERRIDING VETERANS’ 
PREFERENCE BY HR SPECIALISTS 1, 3 (2012), https://www.avuetech.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/WHITE-PAPER-AVUE-DANGERS-OF-OVERRIDING-
VETERANS-PREFERENCE.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9FH-THAW]; see also U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFF., FEDERAL HIRING: DOES VETERANS’ PREFERENCE NEED UPDATING? 1, 2 
(1992), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151726.pdf [https://perma.cc/36DE-PYN7]. 
72 E.g., BROOKS RIX, supra note 71, at 3. 
73 Compare U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., EMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS IN THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH: FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2019), https://www.fedshirevets.gov/veterans-
council/veteran-employment-data/employment-of-veterans-in-the-federal-executive-
branch-fy2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2X8-GNU8], with U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., 
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found that veterans are three to four times more likely to hold federal 
positions than nonveterans.74 While in theory veterans’ preference involves 
only slight bonuses, in practice it operates as a per se bar for many 
nonveteran applicants.75 
This effect creates several problems, most notably a disparate 
discriminatory impact on women and other protected classes, but also a 
trend towards a less qualified federal workforce.76 Additionally, veterans’ 
preference laws have evolved to a point of dizzying complexity; they vary 
by individual veterans, their family members, the specific hiring authorities 
utilized, and even by individual federal human resource specialists and 
hiring managers.77 This complexity results in perceptions of untoward 
favoritism and invites manipulation.78 
 




74 See, e.g., Gregory B. Lewis, The Impact of Veterans’ Preference on the Composition 
and Quality of the Federal Civil Service, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 247, 255 
(2013); Louis J. Virelli III, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Work: The Discriminatory Effect 
Of Veterans’ Preferences On Homosexuals, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1083, 1088 (2005); 
see also Gregory B. Lewis & Mark A. Emmert, Who Pays for Veterans’ Preference?, 16 
ADMIN. & SOC. 328, 342–43 (1984) (finding that veterans’ preference strongly 
influences initial hiring but has lesser effects on promotions, transfers, and retention). 
75 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., CONFLICTING CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES: 
VETERANS’ PREFERENCE AND APPORTIONMENT VS. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY i (1977), https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/120280.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UWM4-N3LT] (“the preferences awarded to veterans often are 
insurmountable barriers for female applicants”) (emphasis added); Veterans’ Preference 
in Public Employment, supra note 18, at 630, n.68 (describing study of federal 
appointments in which women demonstrated superior qualifications to veterans but 
“retained little benefit from their competitive performance once examination scores were 
augmented by veteran bonuses”); see also De Parry, supra note 18, at 74 (“granting a 
bonus of five or ten points on examination scores may constitute an absolute preference 
in the current job market”). 
76 See Part II. 
77 See MSPB, VETERAN HIRING, supra note 56, at i. 
78 See id. at 25–36 (favoritism); id. at ii (finding that hiring officials frequently write job 
specifications with specific veterans in mind, select candidates with limited regard for 
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These problems stem from the conflicting directives that face hiring 
agencies: on one hand, they are required to make selections “solely on the 
basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills, after fair and open 
competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity”;79 on the 
other, they are required to give preference to veterans, regardless of their 
relative qualifications.80 As such, adjustments to the current veterans’ 
preference system are needed.81 
C. History and Overview of Antidiscrimination Law 
1. Civil Rights Act 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in large part because of the 
nation’s history of slavery and Jim Crow.82 Black Americans suffered from 
various forms of discrimination, including in employment, and they began 
to evoke change during the 1950s and 1960s.83 The Civil Rights Movement 
prompted Congress to consider hundreds of civil rights bills,84 despite the 
controversial nature of such legislation,85 and the movement culminated in 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86 
 
their qualifications, and leave positions vacant until preselected veterans retire from 
military service). 
79 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(1); see also 5 C.F.R. § 300.102 (2020). 
80 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(11). 
81 See Part III. 
82 See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact 
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 262–63 (2011); see also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: 
Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 441–43 (1966) (Title VII was principally 
designed to remedy discrimination against Black people). 
83 See, e.g., Craig Westergard, Note, You Catch More Flies with Honey: Reevaluating 
the Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII, 20 MARQ. BENEFITS & 
SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 215, 221–22 (2019) (describing this history). 
84 See Cynthia Elaine Tompkins, Title VII at 50: The Landmark Law Has Significantly 
Impacted Relationships in the Workplace and Society, But Title VII Has Not Reached Its 
True Potential, 89 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 774–82 (2016). 
85 See id. at 785–92. 
86 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e–2000e-17). 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers with fifteen or more 
employees from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.87 The 
statute did not define discrimination, but courts have held that it 
encompasses disparate treatment, disparate impact, harassment, and 
retaliation.88 Title VII has been amended numerous times—most notably in 
1972, when it was extended to cover government employees,89 and in 1991, 
when Congress recognized disparate impact discrimination, clarified the 
burden of proof required for mixed motive cases, and placed statutory caps 
on damages.90 Violations of Title VII may result in an award of backpay, 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, or equitable 
relief.91 
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
The Civil Rights Act also charged Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz 
with studying factors that tend to result in discrimination.92 Wirtz’s study 
 
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); id. § 2000e(b). 
88 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–54 (1981) 
(disparate treatment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (disparate 
impact); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (harassment); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (retaliation). Veterans’ lobbying groups sometimes misunderstand or 
misconstrue the law to omit disparate impact discrimination. See, e.g., CQ Press, supra 
note 48, at 10 (statement of Norman B. Hartnett of the Disabled American Veterans) 
(“[l]aws or regulatory provisions do not discriminate, it is people who discriminate in 
their implementation of such laws and regulations”). 
89 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 
111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)). Courts have held that this extension did not 
cover the military, however. But see generally Westergard, supra note 83 (arguing 
against Title VII’s military exception). 
90 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105–106, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1074–75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a)(1), b(3), 2000e-2(k)). 
91 See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/remedies.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/38XN-89WW]. 
92 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 715, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 266 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14). 
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found that while older workers were not subject to the same sort of animus 
as other classes, employers often assumed that age negatively impacted 
performance.93 Following the Wirtz study, Congress held extensive 
hearings devoted to the problem of age discrimination in employment,94 and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was enacted shortly 
thereafter in 1967.95 
The ADEA prohibits age discrimination and most mandatory retirement 
ages.96 The act originally covered workers between the ages of forty and 
sixty-five, but the upper age limit was raised to seventy in 1978,97 and then 
eliminated in 1986.98 In 1990, the ADEA was amended to prohibit 
employers from coercing employees into early retirements without their 
knowing and voluntary assent.99 In part because age is sufficiently 
dissimilar to the characteristics found in Title VII,100 the ADEA contains 
distinct coverage requirements, causation standards, defenses, and 
remedies.101 
 
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT (1965), https://www.eeoc.gov/reports/older-american-worker-age-
discrimination-employment [https://perma.cc/2DZ7-SZ7N]. 
94 Roberta Sue Alexander, The Future of Disparate Impact Analysis for Age 
Discrimination in a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 75, 79–80 (1999); 
see Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 235 (1990). 
95 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634). 
96 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (f). 
97 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)). 
98 Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 
Stat. 3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)). 
99 See Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634). 
100 E.g., Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz 
Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 759–63 (1997). 
101 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (twenty or more employees); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (but-for causation); Michael C. Harper, Reforming the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act: Proposals and Prospects, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 13, 23–24, 31 (2012) (reasonable factors other than age defense and remedies). 
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3. Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act 
Disability discrimination also has a long history in the United States.102 
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to prohibit disability 
discrimination by federal employers and recipients of federal funds, and it 
modeled the legislation after the Civil Rights Act.103 In 1990, Congress 
passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to extend this 
prohibition to cover private sector employers.104 After several Supreme 
Court decisions limiting the ADA,105 Congress passed the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendment Act in 2008,106 which instructed courts to 
construe the act broadly.107 
The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA contain similar coverage 
requirements to Title VII.108 They also contain similar requirements for 
producing a prima facie case of discrimination—though disability includes 
 
102 See, e.g., Adrienne Phelps Coco, Diseased, Maimed, Mutilated: Categorizations of 
Disability and an Ugly Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago, 44 J. SOC. HIST. 23, 
23–24 (2010) (documenting negative attitudes towards disabled persons and Chicago’s 
“ugly” law); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) 
(upholding state practice of forcibly sterilizing certain disabled persons). 
103 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797); see also Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-
480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4157); Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-565, 68 Stat. 652 (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); Vocational Education Act of 1917, Pub. 
L. No. 64-347, 39 Stat. 929 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 11–29). 
104 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213); Craig Westergard, Note, Unfit to 
Be Seen: Customer Preferences and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 179, 184–85 (2020). 
105 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (strengthening the 
substantial limitation component of the definition of disability); Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577 (1999) (same); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 
516, 523 (1999) (same); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 
(2002) (strengthening the major life activity component of the definition of disability). 
106 See Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3555 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). 
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). 
108 See id. § 12112(b); id. § 12111(2), (5). 
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actual disability, being regarded as disabled, and having a record of 
disability.109 Disability refers to physical or mental impairments that 
substantially limit one or more major life activities.110 Major life activities 
include caring for oneself, eating, sleeping, breathing, seeing, and hearing; 
walking, standing, lifting, and bending; speaking and communicating; 
working and performing manual tasks; thinking, reading, concentrating, and 
learning; and certain bodily functions.111 Both statutes require that 
employers reasonably accommodate disabled employees and job-
applicants.112 
4. Burden-Shifting Framework 
In analyzing employment discrimination claims, courts have established 
a three-part burden-shifting framework which differs depending on whether 
the claim is one of disparate treatment or disparate impact.113 First, a 
plaintiff must produce evidence that he or she: belongs to a protected class; 
was qualified for the position in question; and suffered a materially adverse 
 
109 See id. U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
110 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The ADA does not cover LGBT-related conditions, sex 
behavior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, compulsive gambling, or ongoing substance 
abuse. See id. § 12211. 
111 Id. § 12102(2). Impairments that substantially limit bodily functions generally include 
conditions like cancer or diabetes. See 45 C.F.R. § 1153.103(1) (2020). 
112 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT: 
PROVIDING ACCOMMODATIONS, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/disability-
employment/providing-accommodations/ [https://perma.cc/8EQJ-VUYJ]. 
113 See McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also George 
Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of 
Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2314–23 (2006) (examining the differences 
between disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination); Charles A. Sullivan, 
Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
911, 954, 1000–02 (2005) (describing the dominance of disparate treatment theories of 
discrimination at the expense of disparate impact theories). 
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employment action, either because of his or her membership in a protected 
class or because of a specific discriminatory policy or practice.114 
If the adverse employment action occurred directly—because of the 
plaintiff’s membership in a protected class—the defendant must then 
produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action.115 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove 
that the proffered reason was pretextual, and to persuade the factfinder of 
the unlawful discrimination’s ultimate reality.116 
If the adverse employment action occurred indirectly—because of a 
specific, facially neutral policy with outsized effects on a protected class—
the defendant must then prove the policy or practice was job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.117 The burden then shifts back to the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant could have achieved its objectives 
through other, less discriminatory means, and to likewise persuade the 
factfinder of the unlawful discrimination’s ultimate reality.118 
II. DISPARATE IMPACT AND INEFFICIENCY OF VETERANS’ 
PREFERENCE LAW 
There are two major problems with veterans’ preference law. First, 
veterans’ preference disparately affects women, LGBT persons, disabled 
persons, and other protected classes, which conflicts with antidiscrimination 
law and with the Constitution.119 Second, veterans’ preference is inefficient 
 
114 See, e.g., Tarik Ajami et al., EEO Law Basics, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 6 
(2006), https://silo.tips/download/american-bar-association-20, [https://perma.cc/69UA-
4AT5]. 
115 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: 
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 983 (1999). 
116 Id. 
117 See, e.g., Hannah A. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and 
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and 
Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 430–31 (1982). 
118 Id. 
119 See Part II.A; Part II.B. 
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and does not effectively accomplish its stated policy goals.120 As such, 
Congress should amend veterans’ preference law to better comport with the 
nation’s goals of nondiscrimination and governmental efficiency.121 
A. Disparate Impact of Veterans’ Preference Law 
1. Possible Statutory Preclusion 
Disparate impact liability for veterans’ preference-based personnel 
actions may be statutorily precluded. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 includes a short provision stating that “[n]othing contained in this 
subchapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, 
territorial, or local law creating special rights or preference for veterans.”122 
On its face, this provision seems unequivocal.123 However, there are reasons 
to think that the provision may not preclude statutory liability. First, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 originally applied only to the private sector and 
not the government;124 when Title VII was amended in 1972, the legislature 
 
120 See Part II.C. 
121 See Part III. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11. The EEOC has interpreted this provision as only protecting 
mandatory veterans’ preferences. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE 
NO. 915.056, POLICY GUIDANCE ON VETERANS’ PREFERENCE UNDER TITLE VII (1990), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/veterans_preference.html [https://perma.cc/FEE2-
U5CN]. Preference systems based on policy or undertaken voluntarily may be 
insufficient. Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Tr., 732 F.2d 726, 
730–31 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) (reliance on internal policies 
insufficient); Bailey v. Se. Area Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 561 F. Supp. 895 (N.D.W. 
Va. 1983) (same); Krenzer v. Ford, 429 F. Supp. 499 (D.D.C. 1977) (invalidating 
Veterans Administration policy of appointing only veterans to the Board of Veterans 
Appeals). This guidance is particularly important given the recent proliferation of state 
statutes which contemplate voluntary private sector veterans’ preference systems. Joy 
Waltemath, State Voluntary Veterans’ Preference Laws Keep Marching Along, 
WOLTERS KLUWER (April 23, 2015), 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2015/04/23/state-voluntary-veterans-
preference-laws-keep-marching-along/ [https://perma.cc/C4BM-27ZP]. 
123 See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991) (preeminence 
of the text in statutory interpretation). 
124 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 1964, 78 Stat. 265. 
Questioning the Sacrosanct 61 
VOLUME 19 • ISSUE 1 • 2020 
made no reference to this provision, and so it is possible that it applies only 
to private employers.125 Second, disparate impact liability may be said to 
“preempt” veterans’ preference law instead of “repealing” or “modifying” 
it.126 Third and most significantly, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 
the ADA do not contain similar provisions expressly preserving veterans’ 
preference.127 Nonetheless, courts have indicated that this provision 
prevents most challenges to veterans’ preference statutes, regardless of their 
statutory bases.128 
The legislative history of Title VII does not provide much support for 
this judicial interpretation, however. The first mention of veterans’ 
preference in the congressional record occurred on July 24, 1963, when 
Senator Hubert Humphrey added the veterans’ preference exception as part 
of an overlapping bill.129 The language in the bill was substantially similar 
to what was eventually enacted and the addition appears to have received 
no comment.130 The legislative history contains only two subsequent 
references to veterans’ preference in relation to Title VII, both of which 
seem to be mischaracterizations made by opponents of the legislation.131 
 
125 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at n.9. 
126 The enacting legislature could have chosen a more precise word, such as “preempt,” if 
this was its intended application. On the other hand, diminishing the application of 
veterans’ preference laws could be seen as a modification, and the word “construed” 
likely broadens the meaning of this provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11. 
127 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (ADA); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (Rehabilitation Act); 
id. §§ 621–634 (2018) (ADEA). Discrimination on the basis of veteran status may be 
conceived of as a reasonable factor other than age under the ADEA, however. See, e.g., 
Hodgson v. Approved Pers. Serv., Inc., 529 F.2d 760, 767–68 n.14 (4th Cir. 1975). 
128 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 256 n.2 (1979) (noting that 
this provision may preclude plaintiffs from challenging veterans’ preference statutes 
under Title VII); see also Skillern v. Bolger, 725 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 835 (1984) (challenge to state veterans’ preference laws precluded); Bannerman 
v. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 436 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d per curiam, 
615 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). 
129 109 CONG. REC. 13248 (1963). 
130 See id. 
131 The first remark was made by Rep. John Lesinski, Jr., of Michigan. 110 CONG. REC. 
2536 (1964) (“I urge the veterans to consider the bill carefully, for it could affect their 
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The fact that the provision was included in the 1964 version of the statute 
may indicate that Congress chose to prioritize veterans’ preference over 
nondiscrimination goals—or it may evince the power of veterans’ lobbying 
groups, inattention by the legislature, or compromise on the part of the 
bill’s sponsors. Drawing a definitive conclusion is indeed akin to looking 
over a crowd and picking out one’s friends.132 
2. Disparate Impact on Women 
“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures . . . that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for 
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”133 Here, 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Supreme Court, captures the essence of 
the problem with veterans’ preference: neither good intent, facial neutrality, 
nor Congressional imprimatur can truly redeem veterans’ preference law 
from its discriminatory effects.134 While veterans’ preference statutes may 
 
veterans’ preference rights.”). The second remark was made by Sen. Russell B. Long of 
Louisiana. Id. at 11919 (asserting that veterans’ preference statutes require discrimination 
and that the proposed civil rights law “would result in [those who comply with veterans’ 
preference laws] being put in jail because they had been discriminating”). 
132 E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Pamela L. Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities with Employers’ 
Legitimate Discretion: The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact 
Discrimination under Title VII, 12 INDUS. RELS. L.J. 1, 41 (1990). 
133 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Like the high school diploma 
requirement in Griggs, veterans’ preference statutes are facially neutral. Pat Labbadia III, 
Comment, Veterans’ Preference Statutes: Do They Really Discriminate against Women?, 
18 DUQ. L. REV. 653, 680 (1980). 
134 While the disparate effects of veterans’ preference may be most pronounced for 
women, LGBT persons, and disabled persons, they are also felt by other classes. For 
instance, “veterans’ preference is one of the few, if not the only, neutral selection device 
that affords African Americans an advantage over whites.” Eang L. Ngov, When “The 
Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to 
Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535, n.263 (2011); 
see also Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate 
Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 368 
(1983); Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1973), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (thirty-six percent of white applicants preference eligible, 
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be excepted from disparate impact claims,135 they nonetheless disparately 
affect women and other protected classes and are socially undesirable. 
The disparate effect of veterans’ preference on women is primarily due to 
the military’s history of imposing absolute restrictions on female 
servicepersons. Until 1918, the official policy of the United States was that 
women were not allowed to serve in the military at all.136 Until 1942, 
women were barred from all military positions except those pertaining to 
nursing.137 From 1948 to 1967, Congress officially limited female 
servicepersons to no more than two percent of the total constituency of the 
armed forces.138 After this statutory requirement was lifted, women were 
still ordinarily limited to the same percentage by Department of Defense 
policy.139 Numerous other restrictions endured past the end of this quota 
 
compared to seventy-five percent of Black applicants). Veterans’ preference also 
disparately impacts certain nationalities, and it may impact certain religious groups 
associated with those nationalities. Lewis, supra note 74, at 263 (finding that the number 
of Hispanic and Asian federal employees would be approximately twenty percent higher 
in the absence of veterans’ preference). Veterans’ preference likely operates to the 
advantage of older employees, however, since at least a period of most preference 
eligibles’ lives must have been spent in military service. See GERALD MAYER, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS 
1, 8 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41897.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2B8-SNSY]. This 
Note neglects analysis of the effects of veterans’ preference on other federally protected 
classes, such as political partisans and union affiliates. 
135 Such claims would otherwise easily state a prima facie case of discrimination. See Part 
I.C.4. Women, for instance, are members of a protected class, they generally qualify for 
the federal positions for which they apply, failure to hire is an adverse employment 
action, and veterans’ preference law represents a specific policy which causes employers 
to pass over female job applicants. Veterans’ preference is not job-related and consistent 
with business necessity, since employees are often more productive in the private sector, 
where veterans’ preference is not as widespread. See Part II.C.2. Lastly, there are many 
less discriminatory means by which the policies underlying veterans’ preference may be 
accomplished. See Part III. 
136 Anthony v. Massachusetts., 415 F. Supp. 485, 489–90 (D. Mass. 1976); Fleming & 
Shanor, supra note 10, at n.136. 
137 Anthony, 415 F. Supp. at 489–90; Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at n.136. 
138 Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 § 102, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 
356, 357. 
139 See 10 U.S.C. § 3209(b); 32 C.F.R. § 580.4(b) (1976). 
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system, and many, such as restrictions on women in combat roles, still 
persist today.140 
Women have historically been subject to other restrictions as well. For 
instance, women have been required to meet stricter standards than men 
regarding age, educational attainment, familial status, and physical 
fitness.141 In addition, women have been systematically excluded from the 
military reserves and numerous military academies.142 Perhaps the most 
significant barrier which prevents women from receiving veteran status is 
their exclusion from the selective service.143 
While many women and men may choose not to serve in the military, 
this history of restriction likely contributes to the cultural conception of 
military service as a primarily male endeavor, which artificially depresses 
the number of female enlistees. Women constituted less than one percent of 
the armed forces before 1943; they continued to make up less than two 
 
140 E.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 104–08 (2008); Marcia Clement, Women in 
the Military: Should Combat Roles Be Fully Opened to Women?, 19 CQ RESEARCHER 
957, 963 (2009). 
141 For example, men had to be seventeen to enlist with parental consent, while women 
had to be eighteen; men had to be eighteen to enlist without parental consent, while 
women had to be twenty-one; men without prior military service did not have to possess 
a high school degree, while women did; men were not subject to marriage or child-care 
restrictions, while women were; and men were not subject to sexual history checks, while 
women were. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Harry C. Beans, Sex 
Discrimination in the Military, 67 MIL. L. REV. 19, 54–83 (1975); Note, The Equal 
Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533, 1539–56 (1973); see also 32 
C.F.R. § 571.2 (1976). 
142 Comment, Veterans’ Public Employment Preference as Sex Discrimination: Anthony 
v. Massachusetts and Branch v. Du Bois, 90 HARV. L. REV. 805, 811 n.53 (1977). 
143 50 U.S.C. § 3802 (requiring males over the age of eighteen, but not females, to 
register for the draft); EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 122; see also 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding Congress’s decision to allocate 
funds to draft men but not women). There is a certain amount of tension between Rostker 
and decisions in which courts have struck down statutes which disparately benefit male 
members of the military. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688–91 (1973); see 
also Part II.B. 
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percent of the armed forces until the 1970s.144 Today, around fifteen percent 
of servicepersons are women, which is far from the equal ratio that might 
otherwise be expected.145 
Because the military has a history of express and unambiguous 
discrimination against women, veterans’ preference statutes necessarily 
reflect this history—perpetuating, magnifying, and legitimizing it.146 
Though the effects of sex discrimination in the military have likely 
diminished over time,147 scholars have found that veterans’ preference 
remains a substantial restraint on female appointment and advancement in 
the federal service.148 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), the Government Accountability Office (GAO),149 federal 
 
144 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 13–14; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681 
(“approximately 99% of all members of the uniformed services are male”). 
145 EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, PEW RSCH. CTR., WOMEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY: 
GROWING SHARE, DISTINCTIVE PROFILE 4 (2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2011/12/women-in-the-military.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9A7-
HCWB]; Lewis, supra note 74, at 263. 
146 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 25; Veterans’ Public Employment Preference as 
Sex Discrimination: Anthony v. Massachusetts and Branch v. Du Bois, supra note 142, 
at 812. 
147 Bonnie G. Mani, Challenges and Opportunities for Women to Advance in the Federal 
Civil Service: Veterans’ Preference and Promotions, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 523, 533 
(1999). 
148 See, e.g., Tim Johnson, Service After Serving: Does Veterans’ Preference Diminish 
the Quality of the US Federal Service?, 25 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 669, 671–
72 (2014) (“Given that veterans are predominantly white, heterosexual, native-born 
males, veterans’ preference increases those individuals’ representation in the federal 
service and reduces the representation of Latinos, Asians, females, gays, lesbians, 
bisexuals, and immigrants.”) (internal citations omitted); Bonnie G. Mani, Women in the 
Federal Civil Service: Career Advancement, Veterans’ Preference, and Education, 31 
AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 313 (2001). 
149 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., VETERANS’ PREFERENCE IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 4 
(1977), https://www.gao.gov/assets/100/98596.pdf [https://perma.cc/35D4-SF2C] (“We 
found that large numbers of highly qualified women cannot be certified to Federal 
agencies for employment consideration because they are being displaced on registers by 
the preference afforded to veterans.”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 75, at 11–12 
(documenting instances where women would have ranked significantly higher on federal 
registers but for the application of veterans’ preference, including one instance where a 
female applicant would have bypassed all eighty-one individuals listed ahead of her). 
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managers,150 Congress,151 scholars,152 and courts153 have likewise 
determined that veterans’ preference “operates overwhelmingly to the 
advantage of men” and results in “far fewer opportunities” for women, 
which shows that “such preferences have an adverse impact on women for 
Title VII purposes.”154 
3. Disparate Impact on LGBT Persons 
The military’s past and present discriminatory policies have a similar 
impact on LGBT persons.155 During World War II, all non-heterosexual 
persons were prevented from serving in the military and were discharged, 
and sometimes court-martialed, if they were found to have circumvented 
the military’s restrictions.156 After the war, the military’s official policy 
 
150 CQ Press, supra note 48 (“Federal managers responsible for affirmative action hiring 
complain that preference puts veterans—usually white males—at the top of the civil 
service hiring lists, pushing equally qualified non-veteran women and minority applicants 
out of the running for federal jobs.”). 
151 See, e.g., Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at n.51 (“The legislative conception of 
veterans as a class of males is perhaps most easily inferable from statutes which extend 
preferences to ‘widows’ of veterans.”). 
152 See, e.g., Mani, supra note 147; Kato B. Keeton, Women’s Access to Federal Civil 
Service Management Positions: The Issue of Veterans’ Preference, 22 SE. POL. REV. 37 
(1994); Veterans’ Preference in Public Employment, supra note 18, at 630 (describing 
veterans’ preference law’s “particularly adverse effect on the job opportunities of 
women”). See generally MARY M. HALE & RITA MAE KELLY, GENDER, BUREAUCRACY, 
AND DEMOCRACY: CAREERS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
(Greenwood Press 1989) (documenting the adverse effects of veterans’ preference in 
state governments). 
153 See, e.g., Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252, 256 (M.D. Pa. 1973). 
154 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 122. 
155 Until recently, the circuit courts were split on whether LGBT persons were protected 
by federal antidiscrimination law. Compare Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 
(2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (no), with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of 
Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (yes). The Supreme Court recently considered the 
issue, and it resolved the split in favor of LGBT persons. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). See generally Coco Arima, Protecting the People: Expanding 
Title VII’s Protection Against Sex Discrimination to Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 
68 DEPAUL L. REV. 69 (2019). 
156 Virelli, supra note 74, at 1089; see also Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward 
Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical, and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55, 72–75 
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remained that homosexuality was incompatible with military service 
because it allegedly threatened military cohesion, efficiency, and 
discipline.157 In 1993, the Department of Defense implemented its Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell policy, which continued to suppress LGBT enlistments and 
was not repealed until 2011.158 Today, transgender persons are still 
discriminated against in their attempts to participate in the armed forces.159 
Because of this repressive history, LGBT persons are severely 
underrepresented in the military.160 Therefore, far fewer LGBT persons 
receive veterans’ preference than might otherwise be expected.161 
4. Disparate Impact on Disabled Persons 
Disabled persons are also disparately affected by veterans’ preference. 
This impact is of a different kind than that experienced by women and 
LGBT persons, however, and it is mitigated by certain provisions of 
veterans’ preference law and by special federal hiring authorities for 
disabled persons. Disabled persons are denied the opportunity to gain 
 
(1991) (discussing the military’s pre-World War II policies). See generally ALLAN 
BÉRUBÉ, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN 
WORLD WAR II (20th ed. 1990). 
157 William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and Military Service: Legislation, 
Implementation, and Litigation, 64 UMKC L. REV. 121, 132 (1995) (citing U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., Directive 1332.14, (Jan. 28, 1982); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Directive 1332.30, 
(Jan. 15, 1982)). 
158 Peter Stanley Federman & Nicole M. Rishel Elias, Beyond the Lavender Scare: LGBT 
and Heterosexual Employees in the Federal Workplace, 19 PUB. INTEGRITY 22, 23–26 
(2017); Virelli, supra note 74, at 1098; see also Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3516, (2010) (repeal codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654). 
159 See, e.g., Westergard, supra note 83, at 220–21. 
160 E.g., Gregory B. Lewis & David W. Pitts, LGBT-Heterosexual Differences in 
Perceptions of Fair Treatment in the Federal Service, 47 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 1, 10 
(2015); Lewis, supra note 74, at 263. It should be noted that studies have only found that 
non-heterosexual men are less likely to have served in the military; LGBT women are in 
fact more likely than their heterosexual counterparts to have served. E.g., Lewis & Pitts, 
supra, at 10. These studies have not estimated what the enlistment rates of LGBT women 
might be in the absence of the military’s discriminatory policies, however. See id. 
161 Virelli, supra note 74, at 1098, 1118. 
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veteran status primarily because of the Department of Defense’s enlistment 
standards.162 These standards allow the military discretion to deny 
applications for any number of reasons, such as inadequate vision or 
hearing, epilepsy, insufficient natural teeth, brain disorders, and many other 
physical or mental impairments.163 The military is excepted from the 
reasonable accommodation provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the 
ADA, and so it is not required to adjust its demands to the needs of disabled 
persons.164 Because of these standards, fewer disabled persons join in the 
military than would if the armed forces were subject to the same legal 
requirements as other entities.165 
The military provides substantial benefits to persons who become 
disabled because of their military service, however, including medical care 
and veterans’ preference protections.166 The federal government also 
provides a special hiring authority for disabled persons that permits 
 
162 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Instruction 6130.03 (May 6, 2018), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/613003p.pdf?ver=20
18-05-04-113917-883 [https://perma.cc/TC3F-HVUA]. 
163 See id.; see also Medical Conditions that Can Keep You from Joining the Military, 
MILITARY.COM (2019), https://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/disqualifiers-
medical-conditions.html (summarizing conditions) [https://perma.cc/6NUY-MMZR]. 
164 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(B)(i), 12131; Coffman v. Michigan, 120 F.3d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 
1997) (“claims under the Rehabilitation Act may not be asserted by uniformed members 
of the armed forces”). But see Westergard, supra note 83 (arguing against military 
exceptionalism). 
165 Little scholarship exists on the effects of the military’s enlistment standards on 
disabled persons, though it seems logical that concerns for military readiness may 
insulate these standards from judicial review. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 
135 (1950). See generally Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and 
the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135 (2006). 
166 See Waterstone, supra note 50, at 1105–07 (medical benefits); U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFS., FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS 15–27 (2008), 
http://www.apwuiowa.com/Department%20of%20Veterans%20Affairs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3JZV-QLNG] (same); 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (veterans’ preference); 5 
C.F.R. § 337.101(b)(2) (2020) (same); see also Part II.C.4 (other protections afforded to 
disabled and non-disabled veterans). 
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agencies to expedite hiring processes for them.167 Thus, even if the 
military’s enlistment standards do create a barrier for disabled applicants, 
these policies may mitigate its effects. If veterans’ preference does 
disparately impact disabled persons, individual plaintiffs are more likely to 
be able to state a claim, since the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not 
contain specific provisions preserving veterans’ preference.168 
B. Constitutionality of Veterans’ Preference Law 
1. Possible Constitutional Preclusion 
The Supreme Court may have precluded constitutional challenges to 
veterans’ preference law in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney;169 however, its decision in that case was flawed and should be 
reevaluated.170 In Feeney, the Court upheld a state veterans’ preference 
statute that afforded absolute preference to all qualified veterans.171 While 
the statute extended this preference to “any person, male or female, 
including a nurse,”172 the Supreme Court accepted the lower court’s finding 
that the statute operated “overwhelmingly to the advantage of males.”173 
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the preference law by requiring a finding of 
discriminatory intent on the part of the enacting legislature.174 
 
167 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u); U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT: 
HIRING, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/disability-
employment/hiring/#url=Schedule-A-Hiring-Authority [https://perma.cc/N3MZ-PPNN]. 
168 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (ADA). 
As noted in Part II.A.1, however, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA were modeled 
after Title VII, and courts have been reluctant to expand these statutes beyond the scope 
of the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Skillern v. Bolger, 725 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1984). 
169 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
170 Such a reversal appears unlikely, however, and so this Note focuses on legislative 
solutions. See Part III. 
171 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 262, 279. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 259. 
174 Id. at 279. 
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Ordinarily, intent may mean that an actor knows a particular result is 
likely yet is indifferent to its consequences.175 The Court, however, chose to 
uphold the state preference statute by requiring discrimination that is 
motivated “at least in part because of . . . its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group”—that is, intent which is motivated by animus.176 This 
construction was not required, since the Court is free to evaluate 
constitutional claims unscientifically.177 This choice was also contrary to 
many of the Court’s previous decisions,178 the body of antidiscrimination 
law,179 and the goals of equal protection,180—and it constitutes poor public 
policy.181 
 
175 E.g., David Crump, What Does Intent Mean?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059, 1063–66 
(2010). 
176 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
177 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567–68 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
178 See, e.g., Norwood v Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973) (“A State may not grant the 
type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to 
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.”); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 
121–122 (1967) (accepting statistical discrepancies without evidence of legislative 
animus in racial gerrymandering suit); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 
(1879) (condemning “discriminations which are steps toward reducing [Black people] to 
the condition of a subject race”) (emphasis added). Many of these Supreme Court 
decisions also deal specifically with official discrimination against women. See, e.g., 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (pension benefits); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976) (drinking ages); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (child support); Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (jury selection); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (forced maternity leave); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973) (military dependent benefits); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (parental 
rights). 
179 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (disparate impact under the 
ADEA); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003) (ADA); Alexander v. 
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (recipients of federal funds covered by the Rehabilitation 
Act); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rehabilitation Act). 
180 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 935, 937–39 (1989) (arguing against the Supreme Court’s discriminatory 
purpose requirement because it precludes meaningful results). 
181 See Part II.A; Part II.C. 
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2. Equal Protection Analysis 
Analyzing whether actions by the government violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires three steps.182 
First, a court must determine whether there is a discriminatory 
classification.183 Second, a court must determine which level of scrutiny 
applies to the classification.184 And third, a court must determine whether 
the classification satisfies the chosen level of scrutiny.185 If the 
classification does not, the requirement may be struck down as 
unconstitutional.186 The Supreme Court has strengthened the first 
discriminatory classification requirement and its interplay with the 
appropriate level of scrutiny by requiring a discriminatory purpose, rather 
than disparate impact, in some of its Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence.187 
The discriminatory classification in question here is veterans’ preference. 
Modern federal veterans’ preference is arguably facially neutral and does 
not differentiate between men and women, or other classes, apart from 
veterans.188 Nonetheless, veterans’ preference has a disparate impact upon 
 
182 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the federal 
government because it is incorporated by the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 497–99 
(1954). 
183 See, e.g., Russell W. Galloway Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 121, 121–26 (1989). 
184 Id. This process is unscientific, however, and courts may apply rational basis scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny, depending on whether “it seems like a good idea 
to load the dice.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567–68 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1297–98 (2007) (describing the requirements of each level of scrutiny). 
185 Galloway, supra note 183, at 121–26. 
186 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
187 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976); see also Branch v. Du Bois, 
418 F. Supp. 1128, 1130, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
188 But see Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 26 (in reality veterans’ preference 
statutes are “no more gender-neutral than would be a pre-Nineteenth Amendment statute 
granting public employment preferences to registered voters”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
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several protected classes, including women.189 Equal Protection claims 
based on veterans’ preference have encountered insurmountable resistance 
at this step, however, largely because of the difficulty of proving 
discriminatory purpose.190 Laying aside the near impossibility of 
ascertaining the state of mind of an entire legislative body,191 the forty-year-
old conclusions of certain courts regarding Congress’s lack of legislative 
purpose are weakened by Congress’s clear cognizance of, and apathy 
towards, the effects of veterans’ preference law.192 
If indeed veterans’ preference does not represent purposeful 
discrimination, courts may be justified in applying rational basis scrutiny. 
While the policy goals of veterans’ preference may be legitimate, the means 
the legislature has chosen in pursuing those goals cannot fairly be 
categorized as rational.193 This is because discrimination is neither rational 
nor efficient.194 Moreover, sex discrimination is usually subject to 
 
411 U.S. 677, 689 n.22 (1973) (“these statutes seize upon a group—women—who have 
historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects of this past 
discrimination as a justification for heaping on additional economic disadvantages”) 
(military benefits case). 
189 See Part II.A. 
190 See, e.g., Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at n.5 (compiling failed challenges). 
191 See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality 
Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
192 See, e.g., Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at n.51 (Congressional cognizance of the 
disparate impact of veterans’ preference law); see also Virelli, supra note 74, at 1102 
(arguing that policies such as Don’t Ask Don’t Tell represent even more deliberate 
discrimination by Congress against LGBT persons than policies excluding women from 
the military); Eloise Taylor, Equal Protection; Sex Discrimination; Veterans’ Preference 
Statutes, Feeney v. Massachusetts, 12 AKRON L. REV. 557, 570–71 (1979) (parties are 
presumed to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions). 
193 See Part II.C.1. 
194 E.g., KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 159 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); see 
also Part II.C.2. There are also clearly other, less discriminatory means for Congress to 
achieve its stated policy goals. See Part III. 
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heightened scrutiny, and so veterans’ preference law may thus be 
unconstitutional.195 
3. Due Process Analysis 
Analyzing whether action by the government violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment likewise requires three steps. First, a court 
must determine whether the governmental action implicates Procedural or 
Substantive Due Process.196 Second, a court must determine whether the 
plaintiff has been deprived of an interest in life, liberty, or property.197 And 
third, a court must weigh whether the plaintiff’s interest is likely to be 
affected, whether that interest is surpassed by the government’s own 
legitimate interests, and whether there are any other means available to 
better preserve the plaintiff’s interests.198 
Because there is no fundamental right to federal employment, only 
Procedural Due Process may be implicated by a plaintiff’s challenge of 
veterans’ preference law.199 The Supreme Court has held that employment 
constitutes a property interest within the meaning of the Constitution.200 
 
195 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (sex discrimination); Johnson v. 
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374–75 (1974) (veterans’ preference law); Green v. Waterford 
Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973) (public employment). But see Hoyt v. 
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (applying rational basis scrutiny to sex discrimination 
claim because the Court anachronistically believed women to be “the center of home and 
family life”). 
196 See, e.g., Moya v. Garcia, 895 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2018) (McHugh, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
197 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982). 
198 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
199 E.g., Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff’d 410 U.S. 976 
(1973). 
200 Compare Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972), with Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–600 (1972). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 
(1970). Courts have also held that applicants have the “right to be fairly considered for 
public employment.” Koelfgen, 355 F. Supp. at 250 n.8; see also Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (“the right . . . to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable 
governmental interference comes within the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth 
Amendment”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); Wieman v. 
74 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Under the third step of Due Process analysis, plaintiffs’ interests are likely 
implicated by the preclusive effects of veterans’ preference.201 As under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the government clearly has a bona fide interest in 
rewarding and assisting veterans;202 however, an applicant’s interest in a 
fair chance at securing federal employment also bears weight, particularly 
when the value of potential adjustments to veterans’ preference law are 
considered.203 Absolute preference laws,204 and even some more nuanced 
preference laws, effectively preclude a large number of female, LGBT, and 
disabled applicants from securing federal positions.205 The Due Process 
Clause was designed to ensure that governmental actions beget logical and 
impartial results.206 Veterans’ preference law likely fails this standard.207 
 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (“constitutional protection does extend to the public 
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently . . . discriminatory”); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 122 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“A law which prohibits a 
large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful 
employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, 
without due process of law.”). 
201 See Part I.B.3; Part II.A. 
202 See Part II.C.1. 
203 See Part III. 
204 The most extreme example of this type of law can be seen in one former 
Massachusetts statute, which granted veterans preference even when they failed 
competitive examinations. See, e.g., Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 17–18. 
205 See Part II.A. 
206 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing the policies of “fairness” and “reason” 
which underlie the Due Process Clause); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
499 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (the Due Process Clause promotes “faith that 
our society is run for the many, not the few, and that fair dealing, rather than caprice, will 
govern the affairs of men”). 
207 In addition, legislatively mandated preferences may impermissibly interfere with the 
executive branch’s constitutional power to appoint and remove federal employees. See, 
e.g., White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973 (1958); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. II. Such separation of powers challenges have not generally been 
successful, however. See, e.g., Coster v. United States, 485 F.2d 649, 651 (Ct. Cl. 1973); 
Born v. Allen, 291 F.2d 345, 348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Reynolds v. Lovett, 201 F.2d 181 
(D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1953). Other commentators have argued 
that veterans’ preference is an unconstitutional “badge of nobility.” See Comment, Titles 
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C. Policy Shortcomings of Veterans’ Preference Law 
1. Flawed Foundations 
It must first be acknowledged that the policy goals of veterans’ 
preference are not without merit.208 The Supreme Court has summarized 
these goals as “to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to 
ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic 
service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service 
occupations.”209 These goals are not all created equal, however; while the 
first two bear some weight, the others lack logical and empirical support. 
The most important goal of veterans’ preference is to reward veterans for 
their military service. This was likely the primary purpose for which 
veterans’ preference statutes were enacted following the Civil War and 
World War II.210 The rationale behind the idea of rewarding veterans is 
twofold. First, enlistees receive a relatively small amount in basic pay for 
their service.211 Second, military service sometimes involves undertaking 
 
of Nobility and the Preferential Treatment of Federally Employed Military Veterans, 19 
WAYNE L. REV. 1169 (1973); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
208 Ordinarily, it is the responsibility of the legislature to weigh the importance of various 
policies. See, e.g., Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Anthony 
v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976). Nevertheless, the judiciary 
plays a key role in ensuring that the legislature’s chosen policies are both efficient and 
fair—particularly in cases involving disfavored groups. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: 
Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 42 (1978) (“There is no need to 
panic because courts are now deciding questions of social policy; they have been doing 
this throughout the history of the common law.”). While increased deference may be 
appropriate where Congress acts to directly execute one of its enumerated functions, the 
Supreme Court has held that post-war benefits are sufficiently distant from Congress’s 
military responsibilities to justify judicial scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 688 (1973); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12–14. 
209 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265 (1979). 
210 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 148, at 674; Part I.A. 
211 See, e.g., Rod Powers, Understanding Military Pay, BALANCE CAREERS (May 6, 
2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/understanding-military-pay-3356713 
[https://perma.cc/3YYZ-MKFV]. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2020 MILITARY BASIC 
PAY TABLE, 
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extraordinary risks.212 As such, a basic sense of fairness seems to require 
that society remedy this perceived imbalance.213 
At the risk of questioning the sacrosanct, several aspects of the above 
equation are dubious. First, it is debatable whether servicepersons are 
inadequately compensated. Veterans receive extra benefits such as pension 
plans, subsidized education, lifelong healthcare, and tax-free stipends for 
food and housing which augment their basic pay.214 Second, the degree of 
risk involved in military service is less today than it was following 
enactment of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944,215 and the risks are 
 
https://militarypay.defense.gov/Portals/3/Documents/ActiveDutyTables/2020%20Militar
y%20Basic%20Pay%20Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCU9-DFVT] (enlistee pay), with 
U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., 2020 GENERAL SCHEDULE (GS) LOCALITY PAY TABLE, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-
tables/pdf/2020/RUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6AC-VQ2H] (civilian pay). But see U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., supra (officer pay). 
212 See, e.g., Robert J. Stevenson, The Physical and Social Risks of Military Service 
during War, 5 MICH. SOCIO. REV. 66, 66 (1991). 
213 See, e.g., 90 CONG. REC. 3506 (1944) (“[T]his nation has trained 12,000,000 fighting 
men to destroy and kill. They have been taken away from schools, colleges, and jobs. 
Their home life has been broken up, and they . . . will need jobs, money, training, 
hospitalization, and other assistance. They expect stability and security, so that they can 
start rebuilding their private lives. We must give them all that. It is the least we can do 
for them.”) (statement of Rep. Thomas D’Alesandro). 
214 See, e.g., Marc A. Perez & Mark C. Jansen, Service Member Compensation and 
Benefits Communication: Could the Grass Not Be Greener on the Other Side? 15–19 
(Dec. 2018) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1069690.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8GY-SYA4] 
(concluding that the notion that servicepersons are not compensated as well as their 
civilian counterparts is a myth); Ryan Guina, Do Military Members Get Paid Enough?, 
MILITARY WALLET (Dec. 19, 2017), https://themilitarywallet.com/do-military-members-
get-paid-enough/ [https://perma.cc/4QBF-7WFJ] (documenting benefits); Powers, supra 
note 211 (same); see also Part II.C.4. 
215 See NESE F. DEBRUYNE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY 
OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 1–3 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC3Z-UADB] (sixteen 
percent death rate and thirteen percent injury rate during the Civil War; three percent 
death rate and four percent injury rate during World War II; less than one percent death 
rate and less than one percent injury rate during the Persian Gulf War); Neale D. Guthrie, 
The Impact of Technological Change on Military Manpower in the 21st Century 48–49, 
51 (June 1990) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
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generally known and affirmatively accepted by enlistees.216 Nevertheless, 
the risk of death or serious injury that accompanies military service is 
readily apparent, and so the scales may still weigh in favor of granting 
veterans additional benefits for their service—particularly when they serve 
in combat or when they are compelled to enlist. 
The second goal of veterans’ preference, assisting servicepersons in 
transitioning to civilian life, may also have merit.217 Veterans transitioning 
to civilian life may encounter health issues, cultural barriers, difficulty 
adapting military skills to civilian positions, difficulty competing against 
civilians with more relevant work experience, and other problems.218 
The need to assist transitioning servicepersons, while present, is less 
persuasive today than it was following World War II. First, there are fewer 
 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a232472.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA7U-MT3Z] 
(foreign deployment is relatively rare, and military service increasingly involves 
technical and clerical work). See generally JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WINNING THE WAR 
ON WAR: THE DECLINE OF ARMED CONFLICT WORLDWIDE (2011) (decreasing 
frequency of armed conflict). Reservists and members of the National Guard have been 
denied veterans’ preference in part because the risks they are incur are less than those 
incurred by active duty servicepersons. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 420 
(1948). 
216 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-487, at 29–30 (1975) (“Military service today is purely 
voluntary—a matter of personal choice. The volunteer army [as compared to a drafted 
military] offers a wide variety of advantages including higher salaries, educational 
programs, and assignments in the area of the enlistee’s choice.”) (letter from the Chair of 
the Civil Service Commission to the Chair of the House Committee on Veterans’ 
Affairs). 
217 See, e.g., Mitchell, 333 U.S. at 420–21; H.R. REP. NO. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 4–5 
(1944) (letter of President Franklin D. Roosevelt urging passage of Veterans’ Preference 
Act of 1944); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 378–79 (1974). 
218 See, e.g., Mary Keeling et al., Exploring U.S. Veterans’ Post-Service Employment 
Experiences, 30 MIL. PSYCH. 63 (2018); Christopher Stone & Dianna L. Stone, Factors 
Affecting Hiring Decisions About Veterans, 25 HUM. RES. MGMT. REV. 68 (2015); 
Meagan Conway, Improving the Process of Transferring Military Skills into Civilian 
Certification and Licenses, 2 HOMELAND & NAT’L SEC. L. REV. 1 (2014). Veteran 
unemployment can at least partly be seen as frictional, however. See, e.g., W. S. 
Woytinsky, Prewar Experience: The Labor Force and Employment, 9 SOC. SEC. BULL. 
8, 14–15 (1946). 
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stigmas surrounding veterans today than existed previously.219 Second, 
rehabilitation alone cannot justify ongoing veterans’ preference, since the 
need for rehabilitation generally diminishes as time passes.220 Third, the 
percentage of the workforce transitioning from military service to civilian 
life is much lower today than it was in 1945.221 And fourth, Congress has 
enacted other legal protections to assist veterans in finding private sector 
employment.222 
The third goal of veterans’ preference, incentivizing military service, is 
not supported empirically or logically. Veterans’ preference has not been 
shown to be a significant motivating factor for military enlistees.223 It is 
somewhat illogical to think that enlistees risk their lives merely to receive 
potential future advantages in securing potential future government 
positions.224 In addition, the selective service reduces the need to 
incentivize military service because it can forcibly provide the military with 
new recruits if necessary.225 
 
219 E.g., William Hays Weissman, The OFCCP’s New Veterans’ Regulations Fail to 
Address What Veterans Really Need, 40 EMP. REL. L.J. 31, 32–33 (2014). 
220 See, e.g., id. at 32 (“Hiring a 50 year old veteran who has been in the civilian 
workforce for 20 years . . . does little to assist transitioning veterans.”). 
221 Compare U.S. FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (2019), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLF16OV [https://perma.cc/8XZG-ZZAE] 
(approximately sixty million workers in the United States following World War II), with 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 
1 (1946), https://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/FY1946.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WK2-UN64] 
(approximately thirteen million returning veterans in the United States following World 
War II). 
222 See Part II.C.4. 
223 See, e.g., Rachael Ann Schacherer, The Conditions Affecting Military Enlistments, 3 
PUB. PURPOSE 76 (2005); see also Amy Lutz, Who Joins the Military: A Look at Race, 
Class, and Immigration Status, 36 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 167 (2008); M. REBECCA 
KILBURN & JACOB A. KLERMAN, ENLISTMENT DECISIONS IN THE 1990S: EVIDENCE 
FROM INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA (1999). 
224 E.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 287 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
225 50 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3820. 
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The last goal of veterans’ preference, attracting courageous, obedient, 
and loyal workers to the federal service, is likewise unsupported by data.226 
Congress did not employ this line of thinking when it enacted the Veterans’ 
Preference Act of 1944,227 and the notion is at odds with the rehabilitation 
theory of veterans’ preference, since veterans with marketable qualities 
would not need assistance securing civilian employment.228 Though 
bravery, obedience, and fidelity may be valuable attributes in public 
positions,229 the correlation between these attributes and veteran status 
“lacks a demonstrable factual basis” and “is at most a makeweight 
justification.”230 In fact, veterans’ preference actually tends to reduce the 
overall quality of the federal workforce.231 
2. Inefficiency and Lack of Competition 
Veterans’ preference reduces the quality of the federal workforce because 
it circumvents merit and competition. Researchers have found that veterans’ 
preference leads to a federal workforce that is less educated, that is 
promoted less frequently, and that consistently underperforms.232 In hiring, 
 
226 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 74; Patricia A. Taylor, Income Inequality in the Federal 
Civilian Government, 44 AM. SOCIO. REV. 468, 473 (1979); Ordway, supra note 50, at 
133. 
227 See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 376–77 (1974). 
228 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 49. 
229 Taylor, supra note 192, at 557. 
230 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 29, 49. 
231 See Part II.C.2. 
232 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 74, at 248, 263; Nancy Killefer & Lenny Mendonca, 
Unproductive Uncle Sam, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 14, 2006), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-08-13/unproductive-uncle-sam 
[https://perma.cc/22E8-DRMD]; see also Lewis & Emmert, supra note 74, at 328 
(veterans’ preference “contributes little to . . . competence, representativeness, and 
executive leadership”); Taylor, supra note 226, at 473 (“veterans’ preference, applied at 
entry to the federal service, places individuals of lower ability into jobs for which they 
would otherwise not qualify”). Education and promotions are each strongly correlated 
with job performance. See, e.g., Thomas W. H. Ng & Daniel C. Feldman, How Broadly 
Does Education Contribute to Job Performance?, 62 PERS. PSYCH. 89 (2009); James A. 
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veterans’ preference effectively requires agencies to hire less qualified 
applicants.233 In retention, veterans’ preference leads to the termination of 
more capable personnel in favor of less capable personnel.234 Thus, the 
practical effect of veterans’ preference is to decrease the competence and 
effectiveness of the federal workforce.235 The Veterans’ Preference Act of 
1944 itself implicitly acknowledges this in its exemption of highly graded 
professional and scientific positions.236 The Supreme Court has likewise 
acknowledged that veterans’ preference represents an awkward and 
potentially unfair exception to the normal rules of competition in 
government employment, and may thus constitute “unwise policy.”237 
Veterans’ preference results in inefficiency because it sidesteps the merit 
system and reduces competition.238 The merit system assumes that job 
performance is related to applicant qualifications—which human resources 
professionals attempt to approximate via numeric ratings.239 Veterans’ 
preference, however, destroys the correlation between these ratings and 
applicant qualifications because it permits veterans to “float” to the top of 
registers and receive extra points.240 This inevitably diminishes the 
 
Fairburn & James M. Malcomson, Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle, 38 
REV. ECON. STUDS. 45 (2001). 
233 See Ordway, supra note 50, at 133; see also White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868, 871 (D.C. 
Cir.) (Prettyman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973 (1958). 
234 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Lovett, 201 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 
926 (1953) (retention of less capable personnel in supervisory positions). 
235 See Lewis, supra note 74, at 263; see also Ordway, supra note 50, at 138. 
236 See 5 U.S.C. § 3319(b); see also Veterans’ Preference in Public Employment, supra 
note 18, at 637. There would be no reason for this exemption if veterans’ preference had 
a positive or neutral effect on performance. Because veterans’ preference still applies to 
lower graded positions, however, many would-be federal employees are effectively 
excluded from entry level positions necessary to begin federal careers. See Part I.B.3. 
237 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280–81 (1979). 
238 Making decisions on the basis of merit is both fair and efficient. E.g., William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for 
LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 334–37 (2017). 
239 See, e.g., Harry Kranz, Are Merit and Equity Compatible?, 34 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 434 
(1974). 
240 De Parry, supra note 18, at 67. 
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effectiveness of the merit system and decreases competition.241 A lack of 
competition, whether it be in the market for vegetables, steel, or federal 
employees, invites inefficiency.242 
Veterans’ preference is inefficient for other reasons, too. Veterans’ 
preference diminishes employees’ incentives to achieve higher performance 
ratings.243 Veterans’ preference decreases morale.244 Veterans’ preference 
requires agencies to forgo many of the positive effects of diversity.245 And 
veterans’ preference inflicts a unique burden on nonveterans seeking public 
employment.246 
 
241 Veterans’ Preference in Public Employment, supra note 18, at 629. The ill effects of 
veterans’ preference have less to do with the fact that the beneficiaries are veterans than 
with the suspension of performance-based criteria. Veterans’ Public Employment 
Preference as Sex Discrimination: Anthony v. Massachusetts and Branch v. Du Bois, 
supra note 142, at 807. 
242 See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (the law 
generally favors competition); see also 48 C.F.R. § 6.101 (2020) (assuming that 
competition engenders optimal results in government contracting); De Parry, supra note 
18, at 67 (veterans’ preference statutes grant veterans a “virtual monopoly in public 
employment”). 
243 See White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868, 870 (D.C. Cir.) (Prettyman, J., dissenting) 
(retaining lower performing veterans over higher performing employees diminishes 
incentives for employees to perform well). 
244 See, e.g., Robert H. Elliot, The Fairness of Veterans’ Preference in a State Merit 
System: The Employees’ View, 15 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 311, 321–22 (1986). 
245 See generally Jennifer A. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate 
Performance: A Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011); 
Swinton W. Hudson, Jr., Diversity in the Workforce, 3 J. EDUC. & HUM. DEV. 73 (2014); 
M. V. Lee Badgett et al., The Business Impact of LGBT-Supportive Workplace Policies, 
WILLIAMS INST. (2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Impact-LGBT-Support-Workplace-May-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3P2X-6GJW]; Bonnie McElhinny, Affirmative Action and Veterans’ 
Hiring Preferences: Two Types of Quota Systems, 4 VOICES 1 (2000); Karen A. Jehn, 
Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity: A New Form of Organizing in 
the Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 473 (1998). 
246 Grace Blumberg, De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal 
Protection Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veterans’ Preference in Public Employment, 
26 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1976). 
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3. Historical Overexpansion 
Veterans’ preference law has expanded far beyond the text and intended 
scope of the veterans’ preference statutes of 1865 and 1944.247 Veterans’ 
preference began as a limited pension system to care for disabled 
veterans.248 This original conception of veterans’ preference has been lost 
as the law has expanded to cover federal hiring, nondisabled veterans, and 
non-wartime periods—thanks in part to the efforts of veterans’ lobbying 
groups.249 The veterans’ preference statutes that were enacted after the Civil 
War and World War II were intended to reward veterans of specific military 
conflicts and aid their transition back to civilian life. Today, military 
operations lack the same magnitude, and other laws and modern technology 
reduce the need for rehabilitation.250 Veterans’ preference is now often 
viewed as a right rather than a privilege,251 and this sort of exceptionalism 
undermines veterans.252 Veterans’ preference law has expanded far beyond 
the limited benefits that were originally granted to disabled veterans of 
major conflicts. Because of this expansion, the law is no longer adequately 
supported by its policy underpinnings. 
 
247 See Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); A Resolution to Encourage the Employment 
of Disabled and Discharged Soldiers, Res 27, 38th Cong.,13 Stat. 571 (1865); see also 
Part I.A. The very word “preference” connotes a generalized affinity for veteran 
applicants—rather than the almost per se hiring mandate that veterans’ preference has 
become. Preference, OXFORD ENGLISH ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/preference [https://perma.cc/25ZL-PJ8T]. 
248 See Part I.A.1. 
249 See Part I.A.2; I.A.3. 
250 See Part II.C.1; II.C.4. 
251 E.g., Brooks Rix, supra note 71, at 2. 
252 Michael J. Wishnie, A Boy Gets into Trouble: Service Members, Civil Rights, and 
Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1711–12 (2017) (arguing that 
special treatment of veterans results in a legal isolation that undermines veterans’ 
interests over time). 
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4. Redundancy and Imprecision 
Veterans’ preference law substantially overlaps with numerous other 
state and federal protections for veterans, many of which were enacted after 
the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944. The Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) is the 
most significant of these.253 USERRA prohibits employers from 
discriminating against veterans because of their military service,254 and it 
also requires that employers reinstate veterans under certain conditions.255 
USERRA further mandates that reinstatement-eligible veterans receive 
positions and benefits equivalent to those they would have received in the 
absence of military service.256 
In addition, veterans receive numerous benefits unavailable to civilians. 
For instance, veterans are eligible for special life insurance policies and 
special medical and healthcare benefits.257 Veterans may also receive 
assistance in obtaining housing and acquiring land, and they are shielded 
from litigation for the year following their return from service.258 Veterans 
receive certain preferences when applying to receive government 
contracts,259 and they are also entitled to interest rates that are capped at six 
percent, specialized loans, and protection against foreclosures and 
evictions.260 Employers that hire veterans may receive certain tax credits, 
 
253 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified at amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335). 
254 38 U.S.C. § 4311. 
255 See id. § 4312. 
256 Id. § 4313; see also Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock, 328 U.S. 275, 284 (1946) 
(upholding USERRA predecessor and announcing this “escalator” principle). 
257 38 C.F.R. §§ 8.0–8.34 (2020) (life insurance); id. §§ 17.1–17.4135 (healthcare). 
258 49 C.F.R. §§ 24.124.603 (housing assistance); Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 
U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043 (litigation shield and other protections). 
259 48 C.F.R. § 19. 
260 50 U.S.C. § 3937 (interest rates); id. § 3953 (foreclosures); id. § 3901 (evictions); 38 
C.F.R. §§ 11.75–11.130 (specialized loans). 
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and veterans are also eligible for vocational training and educational 
funding.261 
In addition to being somewhat redundant, veterans’ preference law is also 
imprecise in its attempts to reward and rehabilitate veterans. Rather than 
compensating veterans for their service directly, veterans’ preference grants 
indirect hiring benefits. Rather than providing veterans with tools to secure 
jobs independently, veterans’ preference suspends competition. This 
imprecision provides legislators with an opportunity to improve veterans’ 
preference law to accomplish its goals more directly, while also reducing 
discrimination and inefficiency. 
III. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE VETERANS’ PREFERENCE LAW 
There are numerous ways in which veterans’ preference law could be 
improved. First and most importantly, veterans’ preference could be limited 
in its duration and usage.262 Second, the policy goals of veterans’ preference 
could be accomplished more directly.263 Third, the discriminatory effects of 
veterans’ preference could be mitigated.264 And fourth, inefficiency in 
veterans’ preference law could be reduced.265 Abandoning veterans’ 
preference entirely may be one potential solution—and it would comport 
with the policies of many other countries—but such a drastic departure is 
unlikely.266 Nevertheless, Congress has amended veterans’ preference law 
before, and it can do so again.267 
 
261 See 26 U.S.C. § 51 (federal tax credit); 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.1–21.9770 (job training and 
education). 
262 See Part III.A. 
263 See Part III.B. 
264 See Part III.C. 
265 See Part III.D. 
266 See, e.g., ALEXANDER BELLIS ET AL., U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, SUPPORT 
FOR UK VETERANS 6–7, 50–58 ( 2019), 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7693#fullreport 
[https://perma.cc/TG5B-PQWF]; AUSTL. DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFS., PRIME 
MINISTER’S VETERANS’ EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM, 
https://www.veteransemployment.gov.au/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). Other countries and 
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A. Limit Duration and Usage 
The most effective and politically palatable modification to veterans’ 
preference would probably be to limit its duration and usage. This 
modification has been proposed before by government agencies, the Carter 
administration, and others who have examined veterans’ preference law.268 
Other benefits are similarly limited in their duration,269 and veterans’ 
preference could be better aligned with other areas of federal personnel law, 
such as the three-year noncompetitive hiring authority available for 
returning Peace Corps volunteers.270 
 
some states use tiebreaker systems similar to the 1865 veterans’ preference statute. See, 
e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Priority Hiring, CAN. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS. (Feb. 
12, 2019), https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/education-and-jobs/finding-a-job/federal-
government-jobs/faqs [https://perma.cc/T5VE-5ZNN]; COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-30-210 
(2019). Other proposals hearken back to earlier veterans’ preference systems by 
eliminating register floating and requiring veterans to demonstrate hardship. See Part 
I.A.1; Part I.A.2. 
267 See, e.g., Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976 § 702, Pub. L. 
No. 94-502, 90 Stat. 2405 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2108) (excluding veterans who did not 
serve during specified periods). Previous amendments show that this area of the law is 
not above modification or even contraction. 
268 See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON MIL., NAT’L, AND PUB. SERV., INSPIRED TO SERVE 71–
72 (2020), https://inspire2serve.gov/sites/default/files/final-report/Final%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46CT-G248] (recommending that veterans’ preference be limited to one 
use during the first ten years after service, and that it only apply in tiebreaker situations); 
BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT: 
VETERANS’ PREFERENCE IN COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION 11 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44652.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN2C-ELJ3]; U.S. GEN. ACCT. 
OFF., supra note 75, at 22–23; see Part I.A.3 (Carter administration’s proposal); Anthony 
v. Massachusetts., 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976); CQ Press, supra note 48 (“I 
served 30 years ago . . . . I wasn’t injured. Most of the time I was punching a typewriter 
or being an administrative officer. The United States gave me an education, a law degree, 
helped me buy my first house, enabled me to get a loan to buy the building I had my law 
office in. Why should the non-disabled like myself have some preference 30 years after I 
was in service?”) (statement of Rep. Mo Udall). 
269 See, e.g., Post-Vietnam Era Veterans’ Educational Assistance Act of 1977 §§ 401–
403, Pub. L. No. 94-502, 90 Stat. 2392 (ending educational benefits under the World War 
II GI bill as of January 1, 1977). 
270 5 C.F.R. § 315.607 (2020). 
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Limiting the duration or use of veterans’ preference balances the interests 
of veterans, protected classes, and federal agencies. Veterans would still be 
rewarded for their service, albeit to a lesser degree. Returning veterans 
would still have a leg up in securing government employment, albeit only in 
the years immediately following their return. More notably, these 
limitations would cabin the discriminatory effects of veterans’ preference to 
the periods directly following military conflicts—when the policy goals of 
veterans’ preference are most applicable. Over time, these limitations would 
also result in the selection of more qualified applicants for federal positions. 
For these reasons, Congress should act to limit the duration and use of 
veterans’ preference. 
B. Reward and Assist Veterans Directly 
There are many other ways in which veterans’ preference could be 
improved to more directly accomplish the law’s policy goals.271 First, 
military service could be rewarded directly through higher pay, enlistment 
bonuses, discharge bonuses, service medals, ceremonies, honorary plaques, 
pins, parking spaces, etc.272 Veterans could receive free postsecondary or 
graduate education during their military service, or assistance converting 
their military certifications to civilian credentials.273 Veterans could be 
given resume assistance, career coaching, counseling on their rights under 
 
271 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265 (1979) (the policy goals 
of veterans’ preference are to reward and rehabilitate veterans, incentivize military 
service, and attract skilled individuals to the federal workforce). 
272 See, e.g., Fleming & Shanor, supra note 10, at 54, n.174; Steven Condly et al., The 
Effects of Incentives on Workplace Performance: A Meta‐Analytic Review of Research 
Studies, 16 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT Q. 46, 52 (2003) (benefits of both monetary 
and non-monetary rewards). One of the drawbacks of using veterans’ preference to 
reward military service is that not all veterans want to work for the government after they 
are discharged; direct compensation would help solve this problem. 
273 Conway, supra note 218 (proposing legislation that would help veterans convert 
military certifications to equivalent civilian credentials). 
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USERRA and other statutes, or help meeting potential employers.274 If 
military service requires additional incentives, servicepersons could receive 
larger enlistment bonuses, or veterans’ preference could be limited to 
individuals who serve for a specified number of years.275 If military service 
imbues servicepersons with beneficial qualities, increased service 
requirements would buttress this policy goal, or hiring managers could 
simply measure such attributes directly. There are many ways to better 
accomplish the policy goals of veterans’ preference. 
C. Reduce Discrimination 
Modifying veterans’ preference law could also reduce discrimination 
against women, LGBT persons, disabled persons, and others. Proposals to 
limit veterans’ preference necessarily reduce discrimination because they 
better align with merit selection principles.276 Efforts to reduce barriers to 
entry for women and LGBT persons seeking to enlist, and efforts to amend 
the draft, may also mitigate the disparate effects of veterans’ preference.277 
 
274 See, e.g., AUSTL. DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFS., REHABILITATION (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.dva.gov.au/factsheet-mrc05-rehabilitation (promoting private sector veteran 
employment, providing transitioning veterans with separation documentation and training 
records, and authorizing individualized transition coaching); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., 
VETERANS: KEY FACTS 3, 23–24 (2017), https://www.armedforcescovenant.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Veterans-Key-Facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4NZ-4JXL] 
(providing funding for traditional education, training, and services that connect veterans 
with private sector employers). 
275 See, e.g., Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976). 
Alternatively, transition assistance and veterans’ preference rights might be granted 
exclusively to draftees so as to better comport with the rationale behind the rehabilitation 
policy. 
276 See Part II.C.2. 
277 See, e.g., Patricia Kime, After Court Ruling, Here’s What’s Next for Women and the 
Draft, MILITARY.COM (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2019/02/26/no-women-dont-have-sign-draft-yet-heres-whats-next.html 
[https://perma.cc/54RY-NRUK]; Bill Chappell, Pentagon Says Women Can Now Serve 
in Front-line Ground Combat Positions, NPR (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/03/458319524/pentagon-will-allow-
women-in-frontline-ground-combat-positions [https://perma.cc/MEX6-SQ78]. 
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Other commentators have proposed amending the Constitution to prescribe 
equal rights for women, and such an amendment would likely invalidate 
many veterans’ preference statutes.278 Reducing the complexity of veterans’ 
preference law would also promote nondiscrimination, as well as 
efficiency.279 
D. Reduce Inefficiency 
There are also numerous ways in which veterans’ preference could be 
altered to reduce inefficiency. Limitations on veterans’ preference would 
increase the pool of viable applicants for federal positions, which would 
allow for qualitatively superior hiring decisions.280 In addition, veterans’ 
preference could be limited to servicepersons who meet certain 
performance criteria—such as receiving awards or commendations—or to 
servicepersons who develop skills and abilities relevant to individual 
civilian positions.281 Veterans’ preference might be restricted to hiring 
decisions instead of affecting retention rights and inter-agency promotions, 
where its policy justifications are weaker.282 Congress could also enact 
different kinds of preferences for other citizens in order to further broaden 
 
278 See generally Thomas I. Emerson et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). 
279 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 268, at 11; MSPB, VETERAN HIRING, supra note 56, at 
1. 
280 U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 31, at x. Reducing the scope of veterans’ 
preference would also likely shrink the costs of administration. See, e.g., Evan Harris, 
Veterans Care vs. Other Countries, VETERANS ACTION NETWORK (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160901205003/https://www.veteransactionnetwork.net/ve
terans_care_vs_other_countries/ [https://perma.cc/TC2D-C39A]. 
281 See, e.g., Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976); Ordway, 
supra note 50, at 137. Such a proposal would have the added benefit of incentivizing 
meritorious military service. Alternatively, veterans’ preference could be limited only to 
servicepersons applying for civilian employment within the Department of Defense in 
order to approximate the relevancy criterion. 
282 See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Maurer v. O’Neill, 83 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. 1951) 
(invalidating veterans’ preference in promotions because “the skill of the particular 
examinees in the performance of their tasks is the prime consideration”); Fleming & 
Shanor, supra note 10, at 54, 57–58. 
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the pool of applicants for federal positions.283 There are numerous ways in 
which veterans’ preference could be improved. 
CONCLUSION 
Veterans’ preference originated as a relatively minor benefit but has 
since grown into a colossal and well-entrenched entitlements system—in 
part due to the efforts of veterans’ lobbying groups. Veterans’ preference 
aims to reward veterans for their service and ease their transition to civilian 
life, but it often conflicts with other national policies, such as those favoring 
nondiscrimination and governmental efficiency. These policies are not 
fundamentally at odds, however. Modifications to the veterans’ preference 
system—including time and usage limitations—can and should be enacted 
by Congress. Such modifications would effectively balance worthwhile 
policies like nondiscrimination and efficiency with the nation’s goal of 




283 Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-13.2 (2019) (granting disabled veterans ten 
preference points and non-disabled veterans five preference points), with N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-9-13(C) (2019) (granting residents two preference points per year of residency 
for up to five years and thus ten total points). 
* J.D., April 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Thanks to 
Professor Carl Hernandez for providing feedback and direction for this Note. 
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